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ABSTRACT. The outcome of the United Kingdom’s ‘Brexit’ referendum on leaving the European 
Union necessarily entails both a reconsideration of the status of Gibraltar and changes in Spain’s pers-
pective on a solution to the dispute. Following Brexit, negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU will not only pave the way for a new European and international legal framework, but will also 
create a historic opportunity for Spain to redefine its relationship with Gibraltar, offering the possibi-
lity of new approaches to resolve this historical dispute.
After the crisis of 2013, negotiations reached a stalemate, but the unexpected outcome of the Brexit 
referendum could have tragic consequences for Gibraltar because the obligation to negotiate the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU will likewise oblige Gibraltar to redefine its legal status with the EU, which 
constitutes the legal framework of greatest practical daily application, together with two other interna-
tional legal frameworks, namely the Treaty of Utrecht and the UN declaration on decolonisation. The 
European framework will continue to apply for at least the two years during which withdrawal nego-
tiations are held, providing sufficient legal certainty concerning applicable law in the coming years. 
However, the effects of uncertainty could have a very negative impact on the economy of Gibraltar, 
whose population adopted a clear stance in favour of ‘Bremain’ in the referendum. Furthermore, a 
possible return to the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht has raised fears of the very probable legality of closing 
the border, at Spain’s instigation, if EU law ceases to be applicable in the future.
The unavoidable renegotiation of the status of Gibraltar within the EU will inevitably involve Spain, 
which in 1986 did not question the status endowed in 1972. In the present context, however, Spain 
could leverage the requirement for unanimity at several crucial moments during the process of nego-
tiating British withdrawal as regulated by Art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); thus, va-
rious possible future scenarios for Gibraltar, such as the Norwegian or Swiss models or the antecedent 
of Greenland, will depend on Spain’s consent. In addition, solutions that seek to maintain application 
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of the European Single Market to Gibraltar would in practice be unworkable in the international arena, 
because Gibraltar is not part of the British State and its only status under international law is that of a 
territory awaiting decolonisation in a process supervised by the United Nations.
At the same time, Brexit has opened a window of opportunity for resolving this historical dispute, 
which encompasses both peaceful coexistence between Spain and the small neighbouring community 
of Gibraltar just over the border, and the question of sovereignty that underlies the dispute with the 
United Kingdom. The acting Spanish Government took two important decisions in 2016: it announ-
ced the need to negotiate the status of Gibraltar outside the framework of TEU Art. 50, and it proposed 
joint sovereignty. This historic moment requires strategic decisions supported by broad domestic con-
sensus in Spain, since it is a key issue strongly symbolic of Spanish foreign policy which may have 
important domestic and international consequences.
Spain now has the opportunity to adopt a strategic approach that incorporates a new narrative and 
focus for Gibraltar, and which addresses the pending issue of regulating cross-border relations and 
coexistence with the people of Gibraltar. The unanimous support given in 2016 by all political parties 
for a European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) with Gibraltar within the EU framework 
demonstrates that significant changes are possible for cross-border coexistence. Gibraltar and Campo 
could even adopt a common approach to Brexit and its consequences for Gibraltar and the region, 
enforcing this in their respective States and the EU as negotiations begin.
The format and content of the joint sovereignty proposal announced by Spain is the same as that of 
others presented or negotiated previously. But the 2016 Spanish proposal of Joint Sovereignty has 
structural deficiencies, which make it unworkable in practice. Several objective questions can be 
raised: UK and Gibraltar have yet rejected this proposal; it was made unilaterally by the conservative 
Government of M. Rajoy, without looking for previous supporting consensus inside Spain; and the 
most practical problem which is that the proposal inextricably links cross-border cooperation with the 
resolution of the sovereignty dispute, this creates an impasse given that both the UK and Gibraltar 
have already rejected joint sovereignty.
Instead of Joint Sovereignty negotiations as the answer for the Gibraltar question, the article advocate 
a twofold approach in the current historical negotiating situation for the UK’s departure from the EU: 
a provisional Modus Vivendi for cross-border coexistence, and in parallel an agreement to seek a new 
international and European model for Gibraltar, trying to put an end to historical controversy.
A provisional Modus Vivendi for the cross-border coexistence with Gibraltar could be an interim 
agreement to regulate the aspects that most urgently need the daily normalization. Especially the bor-
der crossing by the Border/Fence, but also others such as the issues of transparency and economic-fi-
nancial collaboration, navigation and jurisdiction over Bay waters, or the use of the airport.
This historic moment could be conducive to moving forwards in new and imaginative ways, with 
initiatives such as that of ‘symbolic sovereignty’ formula via the proposed Principality of Gibraltar 
or City of the British and Spanish Crowns linked to the EU, which offers sufficient constitutional and 
international margins for consideration. This proposal of the Two Crowns Principality, linked to the 
EU, would restore Gibraltar to the Spanish nation and sovereignty, in addition to incorporating it into 
the EU as part of the Kingdom of Spain, ensuring the maintenance of its current organisation and 
powers and entailing agreements on Gibraltar’s economic and financial regime and British retention 
of its military bases.
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I. NEGOTIATION DEADLOCK AND CROSSBORDER COOPERATION
The UK-Spanish difference over Gibraltar is an entrenched dispute that 
raises all kinds of  international issues. The general deadlock and acute crisis 
of  2012-2016, which maintained a status quo clearly favourable to the UK 
and Gibraltar, has suddenly changed after the June 23, 2016 referendum 
supporting a UK withdrawal from the EU. This outcome marks a change of  
historic proportions for the dispute, because it could disrupt one of  the legal, 
economic and institutional bases of  the law that has been consistently applied 
in Gibraltar since 1973.
The consequent sudden obligation to abolish, change or modify Gibraltar’s 
European status substantively affects and alters the rules of  the game, not to 
mention the very game itself, creating a situation now apparently favourable 
to Spanish interests in the short, medium and possibly even long term. This 
represents ‘year zero’ for Gibraltar, currently in a general state of  alarm due 
to the perceived existential threat2, and could be a turning point as regards 
Gibraltar’s relations with Spain, the UK and the EU3.
Negotiations have been in a total deadlock for many years, both 
bilaterally and multilaterally in the UN. In particular, conflict arose between 
the neighbouring territories in 2013 with the artificial reef  crisis and heavier 
border controls4, leading to the intervention of  the European Commission to 
mediate and enforce EU law. The possibility of  ad hoc dialogue structures to 
replace the Trilateral Dialogue Forum of  2004 — which Rajoy’s Government 
2 Fabian Picardo, “Brexit’ would destroy Gibraltar-The Rock could find itself  excluded from 
the main trading bloc and at the mercy of  Spain”, Politico, 03.05.2015.
3 We made a first analysis in “Gibraltar, ‘año cero’: Brexit, Cosoberanía y nuevas oportunidades 
de España”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI  75/2016, 20.10.2016. <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.
org/wps/portal/rielcano_es/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/
elcano_es/zonas_es/ari75-2016-delvallegalvez-gibraltar-ano-cero-brexit-cosoberania-
oportunidades-espana>.
4 Valle GálVez, A. del, “The Gibraltar crisis and the measures, options and strategies open 
to Spain”,  in Cuadernos de Gibraltar- Gibraltar Reports  Nº 1, 2015, pp. 135-147, and Real 
Instituto Elcano, ARI 32/2013, 30.09.2013; “Gibraltar and the EU: the consequences of  the 
conflict between Spain and the United Kingdom for Gibraltar and the European integration 
process”, en, Eckart D. Stratenschulte (Hrsg.) Heilsame Vielfalt? formen differenzierter integration 
in Europe, Edit Nomos Verlagsgessellschaft , Baden-Baden 2014, pages 193-223
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ruled out on assuming power in 2011 — has not materialised since being 
announced in 20125.
Given Spain’s very limited strategic options for Gibraltar6, the dispute 
over sovereignty has reached an impasse, with legal stances that conflict with 
the need for political dialogue and the support of  the Gibraltarian population, 
whose distrust of  Spain has increased with the gradual repeal of  Dialogue 
Forum Agreements, and in particular of  the 2006 Cordoba Agreements 
(annulment of  the airport agreement, renewed suspension of  European 
airline regulations from 2014, and closure of  the Cervantes Institute in 
Gibraltar in 2015).
This structural stalemate7 reflects stances that in my opinion have 
reinforced the relatively strong position that the UK (and consequently 
Gibraltar) had gained in the dispute due to its veto on UN and bilateral 
negotiations and the Spanish Government’s rejection in 2011 of  the Dialogue 
Forum. In addition, after the crisis of  2013 and forty years of  democracy in 
Spain, the United Kingdom may have concluded that the cost of  continuing 
the dispute with Spain was acceptable and that even in very critical moments, 
the hostility and damage was tolerable in proportion to its main interest: the 
incalculable strategic value and advantage of  maintaining — with the support 
of  the United States — naval and air bases and intelligence operations in the 
Strait of  Gibraltar.
In this context of  tension and total disagreement at bilateral and 
multilateral level, signs emerged at the end of  2015 of  a change in attitude 
at cross border level in Campo de Gibraltar, with the local authorities from 
5 Valle GálVez, A. del, “Gibraltar, de foro tripartito a cuatripartito: entre la cooperación 
transfronteriza y la soberanía”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI nº 21/2012, 23.03.2012.
6 Valle GálVez, A. del, “Spanish strategic options for Gibraltar, 300 years after the Treaty 
of  Utrecht”, Chapter in the book Britain, Spain and the Treaty of  Utrecht 1713-2013, Edited 
by Trevor J. Dadson and J. H. Elliott-Studies in Hispanic and Lusophone Cultures- 8 Ed. 
Legenda: Oxford, 2014, pp. 115-128; “España y la cuestión de Gibraltar a los 300 años del 
Tratado de Utrecht”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI, nº 23/2013, 20.06.2013.
7 See the Spanish official position, in the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs Official Statement n 
129 of  11.05.2016, British Foreign Secretary visits Gibraltar´´ i n relation with the visit by 
the British Foreign Secretary, Philip Hammond, to Gibraltar on Wednesday, 11 May 2018. 
<http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/SalaDePrensa/Comunicados/Paginas/2016_
COMUNICADOS/20160511_COMU129.aspx>.
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all political camps evidencing a willingness to cooperate and the desire for a 
détente.
This has especially been reflected in new initiatives aimed at fostering 
effective and practical cooperation, for example the recent creation of  the 
University of  Gibraltar8 and a European Grouping of  Territorial Cooperation 
(EGTC), within the framework of  European regulations. The Cross-Frontier 
Group / Grupo Transfronterizo  (an umbrella association that brings 
together all trade unions in Gibraltar and the Spanish CCOO and UGT trade 
unions, as well as the Chamber of  Commerce of  Gibraltar and Small and 
Medium Enterprise Associations in Gibraltar and La Linea) has promoted 
the creation of  a specific EGTC to foster close cross-border relations 
between Gibraltar and the municipalities of  Campo de Gibraltar, optimise 
the potential for cooperation and develop a new model of  institutional cross-
border relationships based on the interests of  citizens living on either side. 
This initiative has gained the express support of  the provincial government 
of  Cadiz9, the Association of  Municipalities of  Campo and local councils of  
all political colours Campo10, in addition to the Government of  Gibraltar.
The Spanish general election on June 26, 2016, implied changes in Spanish 
foreign policy on Gibraltar. From the outset, 2016 was always going to be an 
important year for this historical dispute, which has left an indelible mark on 
Spanish foreign policy, due to the general elections of  December 2015 and 
then June 2016. It is noteworthy that before the December 22 and June 26, 
2016 general elections, the political parties assumed different stances on the 
subject of  Gibraltar. Partido Popular seems to have returned quite decidedly 
to the idea of  negotiations on joint sovereignty begun in the Aznar-Blair 
period, although this was not mentioned in its 2016 manifesto, focused on 
8 University of  Gibraltar, <http://www.unigib.edu.gi/>.
9 Provincial Government of  Cadiz, (Pleno de la Diputación de Cádiz), 17.02.2016, <http://
www.dipucadiz.es/prensa/actualidad/Aprobacion-del-Plan-Provincial-de-Obras-y-
Servicios/>. 
10 “Mancomunidad aprueba la promoción de la Agrupación Europea Territorial de 
Cooperación”, Andalucia Informacion, 04.03.2016, <http://andaluciainformacion.es/campo-
de-gibraltar/576975/mancomunidad-aprueba-la-promocion-de-la-agrupacion-europea-
territorial-de-cooperacion/>.
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continuing the policy initiated in 201211. Ciudadanos has likewise adopted 
this stance12, issuing some initial statements that emphasised the primacy of  
dialogue and economic cooperation in the region 13, but without offering 
explicit proposals in its electoral programme. Neither has the Podemos Party 
offered any specific proposals, and apart from a statement on the ‘traffic of  
nuclear ships’, seems mainly concerned to uphold the traditional complaint 
about fiscal and economic harm, because in the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of  Congress it emphasised Gibraltar’s status as a tax haven14. Lastly, the 
Socialist Party’s manifesto laid more stress on cooperation and understanding 
for coexistence between Gibraltar and Campo de Gibraltar, reviving and 
returning to the interrupted dialogue 15.
In short, 2016 brought a slight respite to the total deadlock and lack of  
understanding in evidence since 2013, with a desire for greater understanding 
and support for the possibility of  a EGTC on either side of  the border to 
foster institutional cross-border cooperation at local level, but none of  the 
four major parties has clearly defined a new stance on Gibraltar. However, 
11 “España seguirá defendiendo en Naciones Unidas nuestra legítima reclamación de 
Gibraltar recordando que, como establece dicha organización, el principio aplicable para el 
proceso de descolonización de ese territorio es la reintegración de la integridad territorial de 
España. Para ello es preciso que, siguiendo el mandato de Naciones Unidas, Reino Unido 
acepte retomar las negociaciones en ese sentido. Mantendremos nuestra plena disposición 
para la puesta en marcha de un mecanismo de cooperación regional ad hoc en la zona en el 
que, además del Reino Unido y España, estén representados el Gobierno local de Gibraltar, 
la Mancomunidad de Municipios del Campo de Gibraltar y la Junta de Andalucía, con la 
Comisión Europea como observadora”, PP Electoral Manifesto 2016.
12 Proposición no de Ley 162/000205 sobre la cuestión de Gibraltar, Grupo Parlamentario 
Ciudadanos, Boletín Oficial de las Cortes Generales, Congreso de los Diputados, XI Legislatura, 
Serie D, 29.04.2016, Núm. 64, pp. 18-21 <http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L11/
CONG/BOCG/D/BOCG-11-D-64.PDF>  
13 Diario de Sevilla, 10.03.2015, “Ciudadanos apela al diálogo en Gibraltar- Marín aboga por 
que Reino Unido y España “saquen rentabilidad” a la riqueza de la comarca”  
14 Diario de sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, 2016, XI legislatura núm. 15, Comisión de 
Asuntos Exteriores, sesión celebrada el miércoles 17 de febrero de 2016, pág. 20, <http://
www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L11/CONG/DS/CO/DSCD-11-CO-15.PDF>.
15 “Reclamar la soberanía de Gibraltar y la aplicación del Derecho Europeo. Asimismo, 
favorecer los cauces y los foros acordados para resolver problemas de convivencia. En ese 
objetivo, proponer mantener en el peñón el Instituto Cervantes”, PSOE Electoral Manifesto 
2016.
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despite the failure of  a new camp to emerge in the dispute during this period 
of  crisis, there is a new actor: the district of  Campo de Gibraltar. This region 
has its own interests, the foremost of  which is to avoid the adverse effects of  
detrimental decisions taken in London or Madrid.
II. GIBRALTAR AND BREXIT: 
 CHANGES IN THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Above all, Brexit will exert a direct side effect by generating a new 
framework for the dispute that could change the panorama: the unexpected 
vote in favour of  a UK withdrawal from the EU entails a substantial change 
in circumstances, despite the overwhelming vote in favour of  Bremain in 
Gibraltar, apparently turning the situation around to Spain’s advantage.
The negotiations and uncertainty resulting from Brexit serve to reinforce 
Spanish claims on Gibraltar and weaken those of  the UK and Gibraltar. The 
parameters of  the dispute have undergone a radical change. It should be borne 
in mind that there are three fundamental legal frameworks of  the dispute 
which may be structurally affected: the UN declaration on decolonisation, the 
bilateral Treaty of  Utrecht of  1713 and EU law.
Regarding the UN framework, in principle, the UN’s stance remains 
unchanged. However, the scenario of  an obligatory change in Gibraltar’s 
applicable European status will draw attention in the EU to the fact — 
which Spain could legitimately enforce — that the only international legal 
status of  Gibraltar recognised by the UN and the international community 
is that of  a non-self  governing territory awaiting decolonisation which has 
been administered by the UK since 1946. That year the UK registered, 
motu proprio, Gibraltar as a ‘Non-Self-Governing Territory’ . This territory 
was then included on the list of  territories pending of  decolonization of  
the Special Committee on Decolonization (Committee of  24). Year after 
year, since 1964 the UN has insisted that Gibraltar is a territory pending 
decolonization -a process that requires bilateral negotiations between the UK 
and Spain- . In that sense, the UN mandate is to maintain negotiations in 
order to restore Spain’s territorial integrity. In this context, the UN has never 
recognised to Gibraltar’s inhabitants the status of  ‘people’ having the right to 
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self-determination, 16 but instead its own authority to follow up the evolution 
of  the territory 17.
Regarding the bilateral Treaty of  Utrecht, one possibility that is a 
source of  concern in Gibraltar is that Spain will decide to close the border 
after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU18. This situation has been suggested 
as the main and first consequence of  Brexit 19 . Although the border cannot 
be closed at present, such a closure could have a legal basis in the future: the 
second paragraph of  Art. 10 of  the Treaty of  Utrecht refers to ceding the 
territory “without any open communication by land with the country round 
about” for the purpose of  importing “goods”. As indicated 20, this paragraph 
is currently suspended or inapplicable, superseded by EU law on the free 
movement of  goods and people. Brexit could make it possible to reactivate 
this paragraph, giving a legal green light to a political decision. Evidently, 
such a closure can only be contemplated as a future possibility, following 
negotiation of  the UK’s withdrawal and a new international treaty, which in 
turn would entail a new status for Gibraltar in European law. However, as can 
be seen, hypothetically it would be legally possible to reactivate the second 
paragraph of  Article 10, since Brexit would restore its applicability.
Thus, although the border cannot be closed while EU law is still 
applicable, once it ceases to be so Spain could regain full control of  access by 
land under the Treaty of  Utrecht. Furthermore, the last paragraph of  Art. 10 
16 andrés sáenz de santa María, Paz, “¿Derecho de autodeterminación del pueblo de 
Gibraltar?” in A del Valle Gálvez – I González García (Eds.) Gibraltar 300 años, Cádiz 2004, 
pp. 85-108. From the same author Paz andrés “Gibraltar and the Decolonization Law”, in 
Spain and the Treaty of  Utrecht 1713-2013, Edited by Trevor J. Dadson and J. H. Elliott- Studies 
in Hispanic and Lusophone Cultures- 8 Ed. Legenda, Oxford, 2014, p. 94-ss.
17 Valle GálVez, A del. “Gibraltar en las Resoluciones y Decisiones de la Asamblea General 
de la ONU, 1965-2015. algunas valoraciones”, en Pons rafols, X. (Dir.), Las Naciones Unidas 
desde España --70 aniversario de las Naciones Unidas – 60 aniversario del ingreso de España en las 
Naciones Unidas, Madrid 2015, pp. 501-517.
18 ‘Spain ‘could close border’ after Brexit, Spanish official tells Times’ Gibraltar Chronicle 
30.03.2016, <http://chronicle.gi/2016/03/spain-could-close-border-after-brexit-spanish-
official-tells-times/>.
19 ManGas Martín, Araceli (2016). “¿Brexit? Escenarios internacionales y Gibraltar”, DT 
9/2016, Real Instituto Elcano, 17.06.2016.  
20 En “Gibraltar, controles en la Verja y nuevo dialogo ad hoc: la UE se involucra en la 
controversia”, Real Instituto Elcano ARI Nº 62/2014, 19.12.2014.
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of  this treaty is interpreted by the United Kingdom to mean that Gibraltar 
cannot become independent without Spain’s consent, which limits Gibraltar’s 
options in the quest for a new kind of  relationship with the EU.
Regarding the EU framework, the main structural change to the 
economic, institutional and legal status of  Gibraltar will spring from the UK’s 
future withdrawal from the EU. Legally, everything will continue to operate as 
before until Gibraltar’s new situation is determined. Psychologically, however, 
great uncertainty has been created, which together with future changes in the 
legal and economic framework could have a devastating impact on Gibraltar’s 
political, legal and economic situation; even more so than the possibility that 
Spain could regain control over the border in a few years. Furthermore, 
a number of  problems have already been raised that could affect Spanish 
workers and the economy in the region. Understandably, Brexit could be seen 
in Gibraltar as the worst disaster since the Second World War, and one that 
has rendered the debate on Gibraltar’s integration into Schengen irrelevant. 
For its part, the district of  Campo has been highly alarmed by the envisaged 
withdrawal scenarios, as has been discussed at an inter-ministerial meeting on 
Gibraltar in the Spanish Ministry of  Foreign Affairs21.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW STATUS IN THE EU  
AND THE KEY ROLE OF SPAIN IN TEU ART. 50 WITHDRAWAL NEGOTIATIONS
The referendum was an act of  British domestic law, and was translated 
into an official British position with the formal notification. The act 
of  international legal relevance to the EU is precisely the notification of  
withdrawal, which activate all the provisions of  the negotiation and withdrawal 
process established by TEU Article 50 (Article 50.2 begins by noting that “A 
Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of  its intention”); this is the act of  State ad extra with legal relevance for the 
withdrawal negotiation. In this sense, the British Prime Minister, Theresa 
21 Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, Press Release 161, 12.07.161, ‘Interministerial Meeting on 
Gibraltar’,<http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/en/SalaDePrensa/NotasdePrensa/
Paginas/2016_NOTAS_P/20160712_NOTA161.aspx>. 
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May, notified the United Kingdom’s intention to leave the European Union, 
the 29 March 201722.
 The main problem for Gibraltar is that regardless of  the UK’s eventual 
new relationship with the EU, there is a separate obligation to establish a new 
status (or not) for the territory in European law23.
Clearly, it is the British State that is withdrawing from the EU, and 
Gibraltar is not part of  the State formed by the ‘United Kingdom of  Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland’. However, the UK has sovereignty (under the 
Treaty of  Utrecht) and jurisdiction over the territory of  Gibraltar (although 
which parts of  the isthmus, rock and waters the UK has a legal claim to 
sovereignty over remains the subject of  debate). Community legislation and 
EU law in general apply to Gibraltar not because it is part of  the UK (as a 
Member State of  the EU), but because Gibraltar is a European territory for 
whose external relations the UK is responsible. Article 355.3 of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) states that “The provisions 
of  the Treaties shall apply to the European territories for whose external 
relations a Member State is responsible”.
Gibraltar has been in the EC/EU since 1973, as part of  the UK’s 
membership. The specific position of  Gibraltar in the EU has its foundations 
in the status established in the UK Accession Treaty of  1972. As a result, EU 
Law is applicable in Gibraltar, with some significant particularities, given that 
certain parts of  the EC Treaty do not apply to Gibraltar. In fact, Gibraltar 
is excluded from some whole areas of  the EU legislation: Customs Union 
territory; Common Commercial Policy; Rules on the free movement of  goods; 
Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy; obligation to 
levy VAT; and the territory of  Gibraltar is not part of  the Schengen Area, as 
a consequence of  the non-participation of  the UK in the Schengen Treaties; 
this position continues today in the EU (Protocoles 20 and 21 to the TEU 
and the TFEU, by the Treaty of  Lisbon). With these exceptions, EU Law is 
fully applicable, and Gibraltar must comply with all Community legislation 
22 ‘Full text of  Theresa May’s letter triggering Article 50 of  the Lisbon Treaty’, Politics Home, 
29.03.2017,<https://www.politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-policy-agenda/brexit/
news/84672/full-text-theresa-mays-letter-triggering-article-50>.
23 A panorama about Gibraltar and the Brexit in: House of  Lords, European Union 
Committee, Brexit : Gibraltar, 21.02.2017, 13th Report of  Session 2016-17,  HL Paper 116. 
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201617/ldselect/ldeucom/116/116.pdf>.
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that it is not expressly exempt from: transport policy, environment legislation, 
taxation and other EU policies.
This unique status as European territory was not questioned on the 
accession of  Spain in 1986, although the latter has always upheld its rights 
and highlighted the indirect effects of  the dispute in the field of  EU law.
The most important issue is that Gibraltar entered the EU with the UK 
and must leave the EU with the UK. As with any change or alteration in the 
application of  European law in a territory, the unanimous agreement of  all 
members is required, which implies that Spain has the right of  veto.
In the general framework of  withdrawal negotiations under TEU Article 
5024, and in spite o may doubts about the procedural stages25, there are 
several key moments or points at which Spain could assert its interests and 
opposition in decision-making procedures requiring consensus or unanimity. 
Indeed, the entire process envisaged under Art. 50 is shot through with the 
requirement for unanimity at various times, greatly complicating the position 
24 Consolidated version of  the Treaty on European Union OJ C 202, 7.6.2016. Article 50:
“1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own 
constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of  its 
intention. In the light of  the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of  the framework for its future relationship with the Union. 
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf  of  the Union 
by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of  the European 
Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of  entry into force 
of  the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in 
paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, 
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of  paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of  the European Council or 
of  the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of  the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union.
5. If  a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject 
to the procedure referred to in Article 49.”
25 Seen José Martín y Pérez de nanclares, “Brexit and Gibraltar: the Spanish proposal for 
joint sovereignty” 20 SYbIL (2016), pp. 305 – 320, particularly pages. 307-312.
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of  the United Kingdom regarding Gibraltar should Spain adopt an opposing 
stance.
For example, the ‘Guidelines’ of  the European Council (Art. 50.2) must 
be adopted by consensus (adoption of  decision without a vote, by prior 
agreement) among 27 states, excluding the UK, as must the decision to adopt 
the treaty; although TEU Art. 50.2 establishes that this shall be made by 
a qualified majority (20 of  27 states), agreement among all Member States 
is considered desirable. In addition, the EU treaty modifying the TEU and 
TFEU must be ratified by each State, again implying unanimity and the express 
agreement of  Spain, through deposition of  the instrument of  expression of  
consent after authorisation via an Organic Law of  Parliament. Furthermore, 
this withdrawal treaty modifying the TEU and TFEU will probably have to 
be accompanied by a second treaty establishing the conditions of  the future 
relationship with the EU, to be adopted by consensus and with ratification 
by each State. Not to mention that any extension of  the two year negotiating 
period will again require unanimous agreement.
Thus, in principle, Spain will hold the key to unanimity or acquiescence at 
least three times during negotiation of  the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, and 
the Spanish position on Gibraltar could be enforced each time. In fact, the 
Spanish Foreign Minister indicated in 2016 that Gibraltar should be excluded 
from the list of  matters to be discussed during UK withdrawal negotiations, 
thereby leveraging the first key requirement for consensus in the definition 
of  the European Council’s negotiating guidelines26. This was formally 
communicated to the EU Members States and Institutions (28.09.2016)27.
In this context the acting Spanish Government took two important 
decisions in 2016: it announced the need to negotiate the status of  Gibraltar 
outside the framework of  TEU Art. 50, and it proposed a joint sovereignty 
model to solve the dispute.
The Spanish position of  exclusion of  Gibraltar from the EU list of  
topics for negotiation with the UK, has had so far the unanimous support 
of  the remaining EU Member States. The European Council received the 
26 Spain could veto Brexit talks, Margallo says, Gibraltar Chronicle, 21.07.2016 <http://
chronicle.gi/2016/07/spain-could-veto-brexit-talks-margallo-says/>.
27 ‘Margallo pide el apoyo da la UE para excluir a Gibraltar de la negociación del 
Brexit’, El País, 29.09.2016, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/09/29/
actualidad/1475132511_587788.html>.
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letter from the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, notifying the United 
Kingdom’s intention to leave the European Union, the 29 March 2017; and 
two days later the draft European Council guidelines following the United 
Kingdom’s notification under Article 50 TEU included this point: “After 
the United Kingdom leaves the Union, no agreement between the EU and 
the United Kingdom may apply to the territory of  Gibraltar without the 
agreement between the Kingdom of  Spain and the United Kingdom”28. 
The Special European Council (Article 50), in an EU 27 format, adopted 
the guidelines for the Brexit negotiations the 29 April 2017, and approved 
this guideline about Gibraltar (point 24)29. So in principle any decision about 
the application in the future of  the EU Law in Gibraltar is conditioned to a 
previous British-Spanish agreement 30.
Evidently, the UK has indicated that Gibraltar should be fully involved31 in 
negotiation of  Art. 50, and the new British Government has guaranteed that 
there will be no immediate changes32. However, as the British have already 
recognised, the UK’s obligation to carry out a negotiation with multiple 
windows and problems — in principle at a disadvantage compared to the 27 
EU states — does not benefit the Gibraltarian position33. As noted, the initial 
definition of  the negotiating guidelines and the decision whether or not to 
28 Statement by the European Council (Art. 50) on the UK notification, 29.03.2017, <http://
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/29-euco-50-statement-uk-
notification/>.
European Council (Art. 50) - Draft guidelines following the United Kingdom’s notification 
under Article 50 TEU, point 22: <http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.wpengine.netdna-cdn.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf>.
29 Press Release, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-
euco-brexit-guidelines/>.
30 The full document, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2017/4/ 
47244658130_en.pdf>.
31 “UK minister says Gibraltar to be fully involved in Brexit negotiations”, Reuters 12.07.2016, 
<http://in.reuters.com/article/britain-eu-gibraltar-idINKCN0ZS1F1>. 
32 Theresa May garantiza que no se negociará la soberanía de Gibraltar, Europa Sur, 
25.08.2016, <http://www.europasur.es/article/gibraltar/2355053/theresa/may/garantiza/
no/se/negociara/la/soberania/gibraltar.html>.
33 ‘Londres admite que será más difícil proteger el interés de Gibraltar tras el ‘Brexit’‘, El 
País 26.06.2016, <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/06/26/actualidad/ 
1466939267_851906.html>.
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include the status of  Gibraltar in the list of  topics for negotiation both mark 
a crucial milestone, and Spain has already requested –and obtained- that the 
question of  Gibraltar be kept separate from negotiation on the withdrawal 
of  the British State, as the British-Spanish agreement must be previous to any 
agreement about application of  EU Law in Gibraltar.
Thus, the negotiation of  Brexit, which entails the need to change Gibraltar’s 
European regulatory regime, not only highlights the EU’s conception of  
the nature of  this territory, defined internally by British law as an Overseas 
Territory, but also its legal status as a non-self  governing territory pending 
decolonisation, which is Gibraltar’s only recognised international legal status 
in the eyes of  the UN, which Spain could enforce at any time in the EU during 
withdrawal negotiations governed by procedures that repeatedly require the 
unanimous agreement of  the remaining 27 states.
IV. REMAINING IN THE EU: SCOTLAND, THE ‘GREENLAND’ MODEL, AND THE 
MICRO STATE-STYLE RELATIONSHIP
Clearly, the best option for Gibraltar would be to remain within the EU 
and subject to the selected Community policies that are currently applicable, 
especially internal market policies on the provision of  services and movement 
of  persons. However, achieving this would require specific negotiation, as 
would the option of  becoming a third territory in terms of  the internal market, 
free movement of  people and customs union, regardless of  the direction the 
UK decided to take. Alternatively, this objective could also be achieved by 
the UK essentially remaining in the EU (in line with the Norwegian or Swiss 
model, which would not involve structural changes). The ideal situation in the 
Gibraltarians’ view would be to remain in the EU under the same conditions, 
with part of  the territory of  the UK (England and Wales) withdrawing, and 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Gibraltar (which all returned a majority vote 
in favour of  Bremain in the referendum, in the case of  Gibraltar with 95.1%) 
staying34, or alternatively to apply the precedent of  Greenland 35.
34 “Gibraltar negocia con Escocia cómo quedarse en la UE tras el ‘Brexit’”, El País, 27.06.2016 
<http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/06/27/actualidad/1467045208_ 
265698.html>.
35 Chief  Minister’s Statement to the Gibraltar Parliament on return to Gibraltar from London on Post Brexit 
Meetings, 29.06.2016, <https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/new/sites/default/files/press/2016/
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Might the situation of  Gibraltar be different from that of  the UK? In 
principle, it is and should be different, since a future status must be negotiated 
for two different territories: the British State and the European territory of  
Gibraltar under British sovereignty and jurisdiction. In this scenario, one 
source of  confusion should be clarified: present British sovereignty over 
Gibraltar (at least, over the castle, city and port) does not mean that Gibraltar 
is part of  the British State, which since 1972 has been known as ‘the United 
Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern Ireland’.
Although the UK is a State negotiating its withdrawal from an international 
organisation, any specificity of  British domestic law or common law cannot 
override the external definition of  a subject of  international law. This implies 
that the Scottish model would be unworkable, as would the Greenland model, 
due to three factors: a) Greenland is precisely the opposite case, with radically 
different circumstances (territory of  more than 2 million km2 forming part 
of  the American continent); b) the decision about Greenland’s status was 
taken within a State: by Danish internal decision, it was decided that in one 
part of  the territory of  the State of  Denmark (Greenland), Community law 
would not be applicable (restriction of  the territorial scope of  the treaties 
on a State); c) in addition, and this is an even greater legal obstacle, changes 
in application of  the treaties require unanimity: the decision communicated 
by Denmark led to the amendment and reform of  the EEC Treaty, agreed 
unanimously in accordance with the constitutional procedures of  each 
Member State of  the time.
Given the questionable viability of  these proposals36, the Gibraltar 
Government seeks for a “microstate-style relationship with the EU”37, but any 
Press%20Releases/20160629%20Chief%20Minister%20Statement%20to%20the%20
Gibraltar%20Parliament%20on%20return%20to%20Gibraltar%20from%20London%20
on%20Post%20Brexit%20Meetings.pdf>. 
36 An assessment of  these different possibilities in our Analysis “Gibraltar ‘año cero’: Brexit, 
cosoberanía...” ARI 75/2016 cit..  See the critical positions of  Paz andrés sáenz de santa 
María “La nueva propuesta española de soberanía conjunta: Gibraltar en la encrucijada post-
Brexit” Editorial en la Revista General de Derecho Europeo 41, enero 2017, pp. 1-14, en pp. 7-9.; 
José Martín y Pérez de nanclares, “Brexit and Gibraltar: the Spanish proposal for joint 
sovereignty” SYbIL cit., en pp. 317-319.
37 See the Intervention of  Chief  Minister F. Picardo, House of  Lords, el 13.12.2016, and 
comments by P. andrés, RGDeur cit, pp. 8-9.
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status of  this kind needs the unanimity of  the 27 Member States38. Other 
alternatives are being considered, such as the revived option of  integration in 
the UK39, or remaining outside the UK but as a territory of  the British Crown 
(such as the Crown Dependencies of  the Isle of  Man, and the Bailiwicks of  
Jersey and Guernsey). Nonetheless, in practice, all these possibilities would be 
too convoluted to be sustainable in practice in the international arena. There 
are two main reasons for this: Gibraltar does not form part of  the British 
State, and Gibraltar’s only recognised status under international law is that 
of  a territory awaiting decolonisation in a process supervised by the United 
Nations.
However, this integration option in the UK is the worst option for the 
controversy, the situation in Gibraltar and relations with the UK, as it would 
be an absolutely disproportionate challenge to the UN and Spain, leading 
to a collision course all the Spanish-British relations. It is more than a mere 
theoretical elucidation 40.
In short, Gibraltar has a specific status under EU law which in principle 
could be kept separate from the withdrawal negotiations and future status 
of  the British State with respect to the EU. It would appear difficult to find 
a recipe for remaining in the EU capable of  satisfying the requirement for 
unanimous agreement on modification of  the existing treaties.
V. IS JOINT SOVEREIGNTY A SOLUTION?
The idea of   joint sovereignty occasionally began to be suggested in 2015, 
it was in 2016 that this option was firmly announced as the solution41, and was 
presented as such in September 2016. Although the details remain unknown, 
38 As stressed by House of  Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit: Gibraltar, cit., pág. 30, 
punto 17.
39 “Integration could be Brexit fall-back position, Feetham says”, Gibraltar Chronicle 
30.08.2016, <http://chronicle.gi/2016/08/integration-could-be-brexit-fall-back-position-
feetham-says/>. 
40 “La integración en el Reino Unido es un modelo posible”, Interview to F 
Picardo, El País, 07.04.2017, <http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2017/04/07/
actualidad/1491588072_436458.html>. 
41 Margallo ofrece al Reino Unido una cosoberanía en Gibraltar, Europa Sur, 12.07.2016, 
<http://www.europasur.es/article/gibraltar/2327308/margallo/ofrece/reino/unido/una/
cosoberania/gibraltar.html>.
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the former Spanish Foreign Minister outlined the basic ideas of  the proposal: 
transitional joint sovereignty between the UK and Spain, British and Spanish 
nationality, and a Statute of  Autonomy (Art. 144 of  the Spanish Constitution42); 
Spain would assume responsibility for external relations after the UK’s effective 
withdrawal from the EU; Gibraltar would remain part of  the EU; the border and 
border controls would disappear43. All these ideas were subsequently raised by 
Spain at UN headquarters44. It was also included in Decision 2016 on Gibraltar 
of  the Decolonization Committee, and for the first time as a Declaration at the 
Ibero-American Summit of  Cartagena (29.10.201745). Foreign Affairs Minister 
Dastis Quecedo has expressly endorsed this proposal.46
42 “Nosotros le proponemos a Gibraltar cosoberanía entre el Reino Unido y España durante 
un tiempo, transcurrido el cual se reintegraría en la soberanía española. Sus habitantes 
podrían conservar la nacionalidad británica, a la que se añadiría la española, y tendrían 
un Estatuto de Autonomía, como establece el artículo 144 de nuestra Constitución”, 
Interviwe to Foreign Affairs Minister García-Margallo, ABC, 01.08.2016. <http://www.
abc.es/espana/abci-garcia-margallo-si-no-gobierno-declaracion-congreso-podria-disolver-
cortes-201608010309_noticia.html>.
43 Interview ABC 01.08.2016, Ibidem 
44 Statement of  the Ambassador Permanent Representative of  Spain to the United Nations R 
Oyarzun Marchesi, at the 71st Session of  the General Assembly, IV Committee, 04.10.2016, 
<http://www.spainun.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Intervenci%C3%B3n-
Espa%C3%B1a-Item-58-71AG-versi%C3%B3n-compilada-ESP.ING_.pdf>.
Spanish Ambassador Oyarzun declared in UN that the proposal entailed four major 
points: “possible dual-nationality status for Gibraltarians; maintenance of  Gibraltarian self-
governance institutions within the framework of  a wide-ranging system of  autonomy and 
in compliance with the Spanish constitutional system; maintenance of  the Territory’s special 
tax regime, insofar as it was compatible with European Union law; and dismantling the 
fence separating Gibraltar from the rest of  the Iberian Peninsula. Spain and the United 
Kingdom would retain joint authority over matters of  defence, foreign affairs, control of  
external borders, immigration and asylum”, Special Political and Decolonization Committee 
(Fourth Committee) Summary record of  the 3rd meeting Held at Headquarters, New 
York, on Tuesday, 4 October 2016, Doc. A/C.4/71/SR.3,  28.11.2016, p. 2, point 3. 
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N16/307/93/PDF/N1630793.
pdf?OpenElement>.
45 Comunicado Especial sobre la cuestión de Gibraltar, aproved by the 22 Chiefs of  State 
the 29th October 2012, XXV Cumbre Iberoamericana in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 
<http://segib.org/wp-content/uploads/10-COM-ESP-GIBRALTAR-FINAL-E.pdf>.
46 See the intervention of  the Foreign Affairs Minister in the Senado, 11.01.2017. “Dastis 
reitera al R. Unido la “generosa” propuesta de cosoberanía de Gibraltar”,  El Confidencial 
84
Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports
Número 2/Issue # 2, 2016-2017, pp. 67-96
ISSN 2444-7382
Gibraltar, the Brexit, the Symbolic Sovereignty and the Dispute. A Principality in the Straits?
This offer, which revives measures suggested in previous joint sovereignty 
proposals, merits a few comments on the issue of  joint sovereignty. The 
previous proposals contained similar measures, because this recurrent idea 
has been passed around the negotiating tables of  the dispute for some time; 
suffice it to say that in the democratic era, it has been suggested or formally 
presented by the Spanish ministers F. Morán (temporary joint dominium, 
1985), A. Matutes (1998), even advanced by the Gibraltarians themselves in 
the 1970s as a possible solution (‘Nominal Co-sovereignty’), and later in 2010 
by P. Caruana, based on Andorra as the model of  reference. In sum, joint 
sovereignty was expressly negotiated in the period 2001-2002 by the Blair and 
Aznar Governments, undoubtedly the most advanced stage of  negotiation 
reached towards a final solution to the Anglo-Spanish dispute.
Some objective questions can be raised about the idea of  joint sovereignty. 
It is very important to bear in mind the fundamental demands of  each party. 
These are, for Spain, the temporary or transitional (not definitive) nature of  
joint sovereignty; and for the United Kingdom, the acceptance of  Gibraltar 
(in 2002, after the agreement, since 2007, prior to any negotiations or final 
agreement); the UK also wants to maintain exclusive command and control 
of  military bases and intelligence operations in Gibraltar. The Blair/Aznar 
joint sovereignty negotiations showed how complex it can be to reach a 
complete agreement, given the existence of  these nuclear “red lines”.
Nevertheless, experience has shown that despite everything, an agreement 
is possible because the Blair-Aznar negotiations on joint sovereignty reached 
a full written agreement on these fundamental demands, if  we are to believe 
the memoirs of  the head negotiator and British Minister for Europe, Peter 
Hain47. Although the text of  the draft agreement on joint sovereignty — 
subsequently abandoned —is not publically available, this experience indicates 
that these demands could be accommodated, which implies the feasibility of  
renouncing historical stances: in the case of  Spain, the Aznar Government 
eventually accepted that the UK would permanently hold joint sovereignty 
throughout Gibraltar, thus also including the land (and waters) of  the isthmus 
not ceded in the Treaty of  Utrecht. Likewise, and perhaps more importantly 
19.01.2017,<http://www.elconfidencial.com/ultima-hora-en-vivo/2017-01-19/dastis-
reitera-al-r-unido-la-generosa-propuesta-de-cosoberania-de-gibraltar_1116024/>.
47 Outside in, Biteback Publishing, London, 2012, pp. 274-285.
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because this is what truly lies at the heart of  the problem, agreement was 
reached on British control and use of  the military bases within the context 
of  NATO.
This 2016 proposal of  the Government of  M Rajoy has been defended 
openly by some authors48. I believe, however49, the proposal has structural 
deficiencies, which make it unworkable in practice. So several objective 
questions can be raised today against the idea of  joint sovereignty.
The first of  these is that following the 2002 referendum in Gibraltar, 
‘Joint Sovereignty’ has been called into question or discredited, at least 
with that name. Unlike the negotiations in 2001-2002, the UK has adopted 
since 2007 a different stance, whereby it will not take or advance in any 
direction on sovereignty without prior Gibraltarian agreement. Even the UN 
General Assembly’s Fourth Committee (Decolonization) now reflects this 
British new position in its 2016 Decision (“Takes note of  the position of  
the United Kingdom on this issue, that is, the commitment never to enter 
into arrangements ….. nor enter into a process of  sovereignty negotiations 
with which Gibraltar is not content”)50. This is why Spain-UK bilateral 
negotiations do not offer any prospects for progress, and in any case Gibraltar 
has announced to boycott any move towards joint sovereignty.
Second, the proposal made unilaterally by the conservative Government 
of  M. Rajoy, without looking for previous supporting consensus inside 
Spain, formally expressed by the Cortes. Moreover, the joint sovereignty was 
not included in the program of  the Popular Party Manifesto for the 2016 
48 See Paz andrés sáenz de santa María “La nueva propuesta española de soberanía 
conjunta... cit”; José Martín y Pérez de nanclares, “Brexit and Gibraltar: the Spanish 
proposal for joint sovereignty” SYbIL cit.;  M. orteGa carcelén “La propuesta de cosoberanía 
para Gibraltar: beneficios para todos” Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 33/2017 – 12.04.2017. See 
too the opinion of  Peter Hain, ‘Britain should ‘share sovereignty of  Gibraltar with Spain’ – 
Peter Hain’, The Guardian 06.04.2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/06/
britain-should-share-sovereignty-of-gibraltar-with-spain-peter-hain>.
49 A. del Valle GálVez, “Gibraltar and the “Brexit” – New Scenarios within a Historic 
Dispute. A Proposal”, Verfassungsblog on Matters Constitutional, VerfBlog, 17.04.2017.
50 Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee), Draft decision 
submitted by the Chair- Question of  Gibraltar, 07.11.2016, Doc. A/C.4/71/L.17. Approved 
by the UN General Assembly the 6th December 2016, see <http://undocs.org/en/A/
C.4/71/L.17>.
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elections51. And without this internal consensus was submitted to the UN 
and to EU Institutions and EU Member States.
Third, it is doubtful the applicability of  some concrete proposals, such 
as dismantling the British border demarcation (the Fence) and the border 
controls of  the two States in the Frontier/Fence, and maintaining at the same 
time the tax and customs specificities.
There are also other internal and external collateral effects of  the Garcia-
Margallo’s sovereignty proposal that apparently have not been properly 
assessed : the problematic constitution of  a new Autonomous Community, 
the consequences for Morocco’s claims on Ceuta and Melilla, or the internal 
effects on Basque and Catalan nationalist pretensions52.
But perhaps the most practical problem which is that the proposal 
inextricably links cross-border cooperation with the resolution of  the 
sovereignty dispute, this creates an impasse given that both the UK and 
Gibraltar have already rejected joint sovereignty53.
Instead of  Joint Sovereignty negotiations as the answer for the Gibraltar 
question, I advocate a twofold approach in the current historical negotiating 
situation for the UK’s departure from the EU: a Modus Vivendi for cross-border 
coexistence, and in parallel an agreement to seek a new international and 
European model for Gibraltar, trying to put an end to historical controversy.
51 See supra, Footnote 10.
52 “EL PNV se pregunta por qué no puede tener Euskadi cosoberanía ‘si Madrid se la ofrece 
a Gibraltar?’ ”, El Mundo 16.04.2017. It is particularly interesting the approach of  Professor 
reMiro Brotóns, Antonio: “it is obliged to pay attention to the possible unleashing of  
imitative claims in other Spanish regions that could raise the costs of  the recovery of  Gibraltar 
to totally unacceptable levels for Spain. Gibraltar would fit into an autonomous Spain but not 
everything fits into an autonomous regime, at the risk of  making the State an empty shell. 
On the other hand, Morocco has to find additional motives to put its aspirations on Ceuta 
and Melilla in the same mould as the Spanish on Gibraltar. Although legally speaking they 
are not the same, the parallel between both situations has been repeated actively and passively 
so often as to become commonplace. Gibraltar could come back to Spain like a boomerang 
from the other side of  the Straits”, in ‘Gibraltar’, in Cuadernos de Gibraltrar / Gibraltar Reports 
n 1, 2015, p. 13-24 , in page 21.
53 ‘Britain rejects Spain’s talk of  joint sovereignty for Gibraltar’, The Guardian 24.06.2016, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/24/britain-gibraltar-rejects-spains-talk-
joint-sovereignty>; ‘Gibraltar rebuffs Spanish proposal for joint sovereignty to save EU 
status’, The Guardian 06.10.2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/06/
gibraltar-rebuffs-spanish-proposal-for-joint-sovereignty-to-save-eu-status>.
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VI. A PROVISIONAL MODUS VIVENDI
In the current situation, it is in the best interest of  all to reach an interim 
agreement for the normalization of  cross-border coexistence, which can be 
adopted according to the known formula in International Law of  a Modus 
Vivendi. This kind of  instrument can settle a provisional arrangement between 
subjects of  International Law, giving rise to binding obligations in order to 
regulate temporarily a certain situation, and can be later replaced by a formal 
and permanent Agreement54.
In my opinion, it should be necessary to reach an agreement on -at 
least- the following aspects. First, the Border/Fence, which is an EU land 
external border. The issue of  controls and fluidity at the border crossing 
point is crucial for cross-border standardization, especially considering 
the existence of  thousands of  workers crossing the border every day. In 
particular, a border traffic agreement becomes more necessary in the light 
of  the new EU Regulation regarding the reinforcement of  checks at external 
borders (entered into force on 07 April 2017)55. This is the dominating concern in 
Gibraltar56.  Although as we know for UK it is an international border, while 
for Spain it is only a border crossing point (which is located in La Verja57), 
it has been possible on other occasions to reach agreements on traffic flow, 
as happened with the Forum of  Dialogue agreements of  200658. In this area 
54 Stressing the temporarily provisional character of  these agreements, Anthony aust, Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edit., Cambridge 2007, p. 31. Walter rudolf, “Modus Vivendi” 
en la Encyclopedia of  Public International Law, 1986, volume 9, pp. 269-270; Zewdu MenGesHa, 
“Unratified Treaties, Unilateral Declarations and Modus Vivendi: Circumstances to be 
Considered to Have Effect on State Parties” Bahir Dar University Journal of  Law Vol.4, No.1 
(2014) pp, 176-212, p. 203-208.
55 Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 March 
2017, amending regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of  checks against 
relevant databases at external borders, OJ L 74, 18.03.2017, p. 1-7. <http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32017R0458&from=ES>.
56 European Parliament, The Impact of  the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU on Scotland, 
Wales and Gibraltar, AFCO Committee, April 2017, p. 21.
57 A. del Valle, “ La ‘Verja’ de Gibraltar”, en Alejandro del Valle GálVez, Inmaculada 
González García (Eds) Gibraltar, 300 años cit., p. 155-176.
58 Inmaculada González García - Alejandro del Valle GálVez, (Eds) Gibraltar y el Foro 
tripartito de Diálogo, Ed. Dykinson, Madrid, 2009.
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Gibraltar is fully prepared to reach agreements that safeguard the flow of  
border traffic59.
However there are other peremptory issues that should be included 
equally in the Modus Vivendi. An agreement for the exercise of  jurisdiction 
over navigation60, and on police intervention in the waters of  the Bay61, given 
the specific problems that exist 62, in particular in environmental protection 
matters 63.
The moment can also be opportune to address Spain’s concerns about 
financial activities and fiscal transparency, setting out an agreement on 
coordination in these economic activities. Regarding the airport, negotiate 
the normalization of  its use, by suspending existing restrictions and the 
exclusion of  European regulations. It could also be the natural framework 
for consolidating an institutional boost to Gibraltar-Campo Gibraltar 
Cross-Border Cooperation, which could lead to the creation of  a European 
Grouping of  Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).
59 “Gibraltar is of  course prepared to consider any reasonable solution to safeguard border 
flow”, Intervention of  F Picardo in the Constitutional Affairs Commission of  the EP, 
30.01.2017.
60 González García, Inmaculada, “La pesca y el medio ambiente en las aguas de Gibraltar: 
la necesaria cooperación hispano-británica en el marco de la Unión Europea”, Cuadernos de 
Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports Número 1, 2015, pp. 149-170. González García, Inmaculada, 
“The Anglo-Spanish Dispute over the Waters of  Gibraltar and the Tripartite Forum of  
Dialogue” The International Journal of  Marine and Coastal Law, Volume 26, Issue 1, pages 91 
– 117;  González García, I. – acosta sáncHez M., “La difícil aplicación de la estrategia 
marina europea y la protección del medio marino en la bahía de Algeciras/Gibraltar” Revista 
electrónica de estudios internacionales (REEI), n 25, 2013.
61 acosta sáncHez, Miguel “Incidentes hispano-británicos en las aguas de la Bahía de 
Algeciras/Gibraltar (2009-2014): ¿qué soluciones?”, Cuadernos de Gibraltar – Gibraltar Reports, 
Número 1, 2015, pp. 171-208.
62 A proposal in A. del Valle GálVez – I. González García – J. Verdú Baeza, “Propuestas 
para un acuerdo práctico sobre las aguas de Gibraltar”, Estudios de derecho internacional y de 
derecho europeo en homenaje al profesor Manuel Pérez González M. J. aznar GóMez, Coord.;  J. 
cardona llorens - J. A. Pueyo losa - J. L. rodríGuez-Villasante y Prieto - J. M. soBrino 
Heredia (Editores), Volumen I, Tirant, Valencia, 2012, pp. 407-440.
63 Verdú Baeza, Jesús, “La negativa incidencia de las controversias de Gibraltar en el 
medio ambiente en la bahía de Algeciras/Gibraltar” Revista electrónica de estudios internacionales 
(REEI), Nº. 23, 2012
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In my opinion, the agreement for cross-border coexistence that we call 
Modus Vivendi could be adopted considering three basic elements:
A) Continuity of  application of  EU law in the current conditions, until 
new conditions come into force as part of  the negotiations to exit the UK.  
B) Negotiation by UK and Spain, incorporating Gibraltar, the EU and 
the regional and local authorities (Junta de Andalucía / Campo de Gibraltar), 
depending on the respective competencies.
C) Formally, the Modus Vivendi Agreement must be adopted by the 
United Kingdom and Spain, and where appropriate attributing to the EU the 
guarantee of  its application.
VII.  LOOKING FOR NEW IMAGINATIVE PROPOSALS.  
A PRINCIPALITY IN THE STRAITS? THE SYMBOLIC SOVEREIGNTY FORMULA.
The acting Spanish Government announced in 2016 its desire for separate 
negotiations over Gibraltar, while at the same time offering the possibility of  
joint sovereignty mentioned earlier, whereby Gibraltar would be incorporated 
into Spain as the 18th Spanish Autonomous Region.
However, the Brexit scenario is so utterly novel that the advantageous 
position so suddenly acquired by Spain — in my opinion, circumstantial 
rather than structural — could be deployed to attempt to solve this historical 
dispute. If  the dispute is indeed entering a new historic stage due to changes 
in one of  the fundamental parameters regulating the status of  and relations 
with Gibraltar, then this is the ideal moment to devise imaginative proposals 
that would solve the thorny problem of  finding an answer acceptable to all 
parties.
Such an answer should be based on the fundamental interests of  the 
stakeholders involved. Let us remember these nuclear interests: for Spain, 
recovering some form of  sovereignty over the kingdom’s lost city; for the UK, 
maintaining its military bases and intelligence operations; and for Gibraltar, 
consultation and the power to decide on its future respecting its specific 
identity. It should also be borne in mind that in this symbiotic relationship, 
the UK defends Gibraltar’s primary interests as its own (consultation before, 
during and after) and vice versa (hence the permanent Gibraltarian awareness 
campaign directed at the United States on the importance of  UK military 
bases, even while having no responsibility for defence).
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In these essential interests there are elements that have been appearing and 
shaped as added interests in recent years. Thus, for Spain, progressively the 
general interests have been identified with those of  the Campo de Gibraltar. 
In addition, there are other related interests, which Spain has historically 
not considered a priority but which require urgent concern for Spain as a 
national interest: that of  opacity and the necessary democratic control of  
British military and intelligence bases in the Bay of  Algeciras, serious risk 
for the security of  the Spaniards. On the other hand, in the British political 
parties and in particular the conservative party, the symbolic character of  the 
sovereignty over Gibraltar has been reinforced, as a component associated in 
the collective imagination to the British Empire. Probably the Brexit specific 
context may have added new interests for Gibraltar: I think it is likely that, 
following the Brexit referendum in June 2016, Gibraltar will also have as 
essential interest a minimum of  certainty about its political, institutional and 
economic future in the medium and long term. It seems clear that in this 
situation of  uncertainty the historical distrust of  Gibraltar towards Spain has 
been accentuated, given the recent policy of  confrontation with Gibraltar in 
the period 2013-2015, which has included, among other things, the progressive 
dismantling of  the agreements reached since 2004 by the Dialogue Forum, 
and the cancellation of  the Forum itself.
In reality, the analysis of  interests in presence cannot neglect the fact 
that the question passes by very strong symbolic, and therefore, irrational 
elements, which periodically encroach on public means and opinions. For 
all parties, the problem is of  a highly symbolic nature but also requires real 
willingness to compromise in order to achieve an imaginative and enriching 
solution for all, particularly for Campo de Gibraltar, whose interests the 
Spanish authorities should increasingly adopt as their own.
Thus, a brief  outline will be given below of  a new proposal that could 
offer theoretical grounds for consideration. It is the Principality or Crown City 
approach, or the City of  the British and Spanish Crowns, which involves a kind of  
symbolic sovereignty in common between the two states, with a status that is 
associated with and coordinated by the EU.
Certain basic ideas could support its legal feasibility64. 
64 We first proposed this Two Crowns formula in “Gibraltar, ‘año cero’: Brexit, Cosoberanía 
y nuevas oportunidades de España” ARI Elcano 20.10.2016 cit.
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With regard to the question of  territorial integrity, the UN has never 
categorically stated that, expressis verbis, Gibraltar must be reincorporated 
into Spanish territory; the UN General Assembly has only once referred to 
paragraph 6 of  Resolution 1514 (XV), and then only as a recital. Although 
the UN has indicated that the principle of  territorial integrity (of  Spain) is 
valid and applicable in the colonial situation of  Gibraltar, territorial restitution 
as the ultimate solution is a deduction reached by Spain for a series of  
historical and legal reasons, and because of  the UN’s position on Gibraltar 65. 
Therefore, the restitution of  Spanish sovereignty does not necessarily imply 
the inclusion of  Gibraltar in the Spanish regional or provincial territorial 
structure. An agreement or treaty on ‘shared sovereignty’ that brought the 
Principality or City of  Gibraltar under Spanish sovereignty as a Crown City 
would not require its adaptation to the provincial or autonomous region 
structure. In fact, the Kingdom of  Spain already has other territories that 
are not integrated into the provincial or autonomous region or city structure 
(the Chafarinas Islands, the Alhucemas Islands and Rock and the Peñón de 
Vélez) 66.
Thus, restitution of  the city to Spain by means of  a treaty of  sovereignty 
would imply theoretical affiliation to the Crown: naturally, the Spanish Crown 
cannot ‘possess’ or administer Spanish territories nor exercise an executive 
role, a function that corresponds to the Government. For example, the 
aforementioned Spanish islands on the African coast are under the direct 
rule of  the Spanish Government. Since this is not the place to expand on 
these ideas in detail, suffice it to say that with the instruments of  Art. 93 of  
the Spanish Constitution and an international treaty, the exercise of  power in 
the territory of  Gibraltar derived from the Constitution could be transferred 
to the EU and the United Kingdom. This would require a minimal reform 
of  the Constitution, and probably of  the Statute of  Andalusia, not only to 
block the provision for expansion into Gibraltar as a “historical territory” 
of  Andalusia (Additional Provision 1) but also to recognise the special 
relationship between Gibraltar and Campo de Gibraltar.
65 Valle GálVez, A. del, “Gibraltar en las Resoluciones y Decisiones de la Asamblea General 
de la ONU, 1965-2015. algunas valoraciones”, en Pons rafols, X. (Dir.), Las Naciones Unidas 
desde España, op. cit. p. 513-ss
66 Valle GálVez, A. del, “Ceuta, Melilla, Chafarinas, Vélez y Alhucemas: tomar la iniciativa”, 
Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 163/2011, 20.12.2011.
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A Principality treaty on Gibraltar linked to the EU and based on the 
concept of  a City of  the British and Spanish Crowns would not involve the 
territorial stances encompassed in the notion of  joint sovereignty, being 
focused instead on the question of  the exercise of  sovereign functions, and 
the symbolic meaning of  sovereignty powers. The treaty would automatically 
incorporate Gibraltar into the Kingdom of  Spain and therefore into the 
EU, respecting the current political organisation of  Gibraltar. Regardless 
of  how the UK decided to link Gibraltar to the British Crown and State, 
the treaty would involve the legal integration of  Gibraltar into the State 
of  the ‘Kingdom of  Spain’, and its citizens would become part of  the 
Spanish nation and people, with a recognised right to elect a parliamentary 
representative. Inevitably, an agreement such as the one proposed, although 
simple and essentially symbolic in nature, would entail additional agreements 
on the military bases (which would imply the necessary democratic control by 
parliament of  bases in the Bay of  Algeciras), responsibility for foreign affairs 
and defence, and cross-border cooperation and institutional ties with Campo 
de Gibraltar, as well as several modus vivendi on cooperation and control of  
the waters, or on economic and financial activities that through institutional 
ties with neighbouring Campo would enhance economic development in the 
region.
The proposal would provide a unique solution to the unique problem 
of  Gibraltar, dispelling analogies with Spanish internal problems, and clearly 
marking a difference in the inevitable comparison with Ceuta and Melilla67.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
With negotiations at a stalemate since the crisis of  2013 and the 
regulation of  coexistence and cross-border relations with Gibraltar far from 
satisfactory, the unexpected outcome of  the Brexit referendum may have 
historic consequences for Gibraltar.
Indeed, the obligation to negotiate a UK withdrawal from the EU 
will compel Gibraltar to redefine its European legal status, regardless of  
whether it remains within or outside EU law. This places Gibraltar in the 
67 Valle GálVez, A. del, “Gibraltar – Ceuta y Melilla: ejercicio comparativo desde el Derecho 
Internacional”, en Joaquín Alcaide Fernández y Eulalia W. Petit de Gabriel (Editores) España 
y la unión europea en el orden internacional,  Ed Tirant Lo Blanch, Valencia 2017, pp. 179-191.
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very uncomfortable position of  being forced to seek and negotiate a new 
arrangement in the all important EU legal framework; unquestionably the 
framework of  greatest practical daily application, together with two other 
international legal frameworks, namely the Treaty of  Utrecht and the UN 
declaration on decolonisation.
Evidently, the European framework will continue to apply for at least the 
two years during which withdrawal negotiations are held, and could even be 
subsequently extended, thus providing sufficient legal certainty concerning 
applicable law in the coming years. However, the effects of  uncertainty could 
have a very negative impact on the economy of  Gibraltar, whose population 
voted quite clearly in favour of  Bremain. Furthermore, the possible return to 
the 1713 Treaty of  Utrecht has raised fears of  the very probable legality of  
closing the border, at Spain’s instigation, in the unlikely future event that EU 
law ceases to be applicable.
Spain is in a different position now than it was in 1985 when it entered 
the EC. Therefore, the unavoidable renegotiation of  Gibraltar’s unique 
status within the EU will depend on the agreement of  Spain, which in 1986 
did not question the status endowed in 1972 but may well do so now, in 
defence of  its interests. In this context, Spain could leverage the requirement 
for unanimity at several crucial moments during the process of  negotiating 
British withdrawal, since various possible future scenarios for Gibraltar, such 
as the Norwegian or Swiss models or the antecedent of  Greenland, will 
depend on Spain’s consent.
Paradoxically, however, Brexit also opens multiple windows of  opportunity 
for this historical dispute. This unexpected turn of  events could help resolve 
the problem, which encompasses both peaceful coexistence between Spain 
and the small neighbouring community of  Gibraltar just over the border, 
and the question of  sovereignty that underlies the dispute with the United 
Kingdom.
In this present juncture, the acting Spanish Government took two 
important decisions in 2016; it announced the need to negotiate the status 
of  Gibraltar outside the framework of  TEU Art. 50, and it proposed joint 
sovereignty.
In this context, several ideas can be suggested as conclusions:
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1. This delicate and very particular historic circumstance requires strategic 
decisions supported by broad domestic consensus in Spain. This is a key 
issue strongly symbolic of  Spanish foreign policy. It should be borne in mind 
that the restitution of  Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty is a complex decision 
of  a political nature that is not strictly related to foreign policy. It is very 
important to emphasize that the current Spanish position towards Gibraltar is 
conditioned by the Proposition approved in the Congress in November 2016, 
which advocates consensus in Congress for a State strategy on Gibraltar, 
Dialogue with the Gibraltar authorities, and preserve the interest for cross-
border workers and the Campo de Gibraltar 68.
2. Spain may now have the opportunity to adopt a new strategic focus and 
approach to the question that incorporates a new and convincing narrative 
for Gibraltar which is acceptable to and recognised by Spanish citizens in 
the current historical moment. Present circumstances may provide the 
opportunity to resolve the pending issue of  regulating cross-border relations 
with Gibraltar, accepting not only the proximity of  but also coexistence with 
its population in a context of  gradual integration into the Spanish nation.
3. In this vein on cross-border relations, the unanimous support given 
in 2016 by all Spanish political parties at local, district and provincial levels 
of  Cadiz for a EGTC with Gibraltar in the EU framework indicates that 
significant changes are possible in order to address and develop cross-border 
coexistence. In addition, the time is ripe to consolidate the shared cross-
border interests of  Gibraltar and Campo de Gibraltar69. In this sense, both 
entities could adopt a common approach to Brexit and its consequences for 
Gibraltar and the region, enforcing this in their respective States and the EU 
as negotiations begin, in particular with respect to institutional cross-border 
68 Proposición no de Ley (PNL) presentada por el Grupo Socialista 161/000634, BOCG 
Congreso de los Diputados, 25.10.2016 Serie D nº 38, 67-69; BOCG Congreso de los 
Diputados, 16.11.2016, Serie D nº 51, pp. 28-2). Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los 
Diputados, Comisión de Exteriores, n 42 de 02.11.2016, p. 13-ss. <http://www.congreso.
es/public_oficiales/L12/CONG/DS/CO/DSCD-12-CO-42.PDF>. ‘El Congreso se 
desmarca de la oferta de Margallo sobre Gibraltar- La Comisión de Exteriores pide consenso 
e insta al Gobierno a no adoptar “acciones unilaterales” ’, El País, 02.11.2016, <http://
politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/11/02/actualidad/1478111616_884722.html>. 
69 Picardo y el Grupo Transfronterizo impulsarán mesas de cooperación, EuropaSur 
27.08.2016,<http://www.europasur.es/article/gibraltar/2356330/picardo/y/grupo/
transfronterizo/impulsaran/mesas/cooperacion.html>
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cooperation and a unique, common economic and legal status. At such an 
important historical juncture, this would enhance the gradual trend towards 
identification of  Spain’s interests with those of  the Spanish citizens who 
live in closest proximity to the territorial problem and dispute, the residents 
of  Campo de Gibraltar, who have historically been those who have most 
suffered the consequences of  decisions taken by distant governments, such 
as the one to close the border.
4. The format and content of  the joint sovereignty proposal by the Spanish 
Government is the same as that of  others presented or negotiated previously. 
But the 2016 Spanish proposal of  Joint Sovereignty has structural deficiencies, 
which make it unworkable in practice. Several objective questions can be raised 
today against the idea of  joint sovereignty: UK and Gibraltar have yet rejected 
the proposal; it was made unilaterally by the conservative Government of  
M. Rajoy, without looking for previous supporting consensus inside Spain; 
and the most practical problem which is that the proposal inextricably links 
cross-border cooperation with the resolution of  the sovereignty dispute, this 
creates an impasse given that both the UK and Gibraltar have already rejected 
joint sovereignty.
5. Instead of  Joint Sovereignty negotiations as the answer for the Gibraltar 
question, I advocate a twofold approach in the current historical negotiating 
situation for the UK’s departure from the EU: a provisional Modus Vivendi 
for cross-border coexistence, and in parallel an agreement to seek a new 
international and European model for Gibraltar, trying to put an end to 
historical controversy.
A provisional Modus Vivendi for the cross-border coexistence with Gibraltar 
could be an interim agreement to regulate the aspects that most urgently need 
the daily normalization . Of  course first and especially the border crossing 
by the Border/Fence, but also others such as the issues of  transparency and 
economic-financial collaboration, navigation and jurisdiction over Bay waters, 
or the use of  the airport.
6. This historic moment could be conducive to moving forwards in new 
and imaginative ways, with initiatives such as that of  ‘symbolic sovereignty’ 
formula via the proposed Principality of  Gibraltar or City of  the British and 
Spanish Crowns linked to the EU, which offers sufficient constitutional and 
international margins for consideration. This proposal of  the Two Crowns 
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Principality would restore Gibraltar to the Spanish nation and sovereignty, 
in addition to incorporating it into the EU as part of  the Kingdom of  
Spain, ensuring the maintenance of  its current organisation and powers and 
entailing agreements on Gibraltar’s economic and financial regime and British 
retention of  its military bases.
The ‘Modus Vivendi’ would be a provisional measure pending 
the settlement of  a new international and European status. The agreement 
for the commencement of  negotiations on sovereignty, as well as the ‘Modus 
Vivendi’ accord, could be incorporated in the Treaty on the UK’s withdrawal 
from and future relationship with the EU by way of  a Protocol or Declaration. 
Each has a different legal and jurisdictional effect since Protocols form part 
of  an international Treaty.
* * * * *
Following Brexit, negotiations on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will 
not only pave the way for a new European and international legal framework, 
which has been described as ‘year zero’ for Gibraltar, but will also create a 
historic opportunity for Spain to redefine its relationship with Gibraltar, an 
opportunity which could be leveraged to devise important and imaginative 
initiatives that foster coexistence and offer reasonable and pragmatic 
ways forwards that will resolve this historical dispute. The 2016 Spanish 
Joint Sovereignty proposal is probably not the right start for the solution, 
and perhaps we must explore new Symbolic Sovereignty formulas, like a 
Principality in the Straits. Nevertheless, we must be aware that the current 
situation is not favourable for the presentation of  major initiatives to solve 
the complex issues linked to the historical controversy, including those of  
coexistence with the surrounding area of  the Campo de Gibraltar. The policy 
period of  confrontation with Gibraltar (particularly the years 2013-2015) 
also meant the annulment of  the Forum of  Dialogue 2006 agreements for 
the normalization of  cross-border coexistence, and the Forum itself. The 
historical distrust towards Spain is added to the very delicate situation of  
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom when Brexit negotiations begin.

